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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 Nos. 12-3443, 13-1035, & 13-1552  
 ___________ 
 
 EMMANUEL EHIKHUEMHEN, 
                  Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
     Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-445-607) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Dorothy Harbeck 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 21, 2013 
 
 Before:  FISHER, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 23, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Emmanuel Ehikhuemhen petitions for review of three separate orders issued by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  The first order denied Ehikhuemhen’s 
 2 
 
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United 
Nations’ Convention Against Torture (CAT); the second denied Ehikhuemhen’s motion 
to reopen; and the third denied Ehikhuemhen’s motion for reconsideration.  For the 
following reasons, we will dismiss the petitions in part and deny them in part. 
I. Introduction and Background 
 Ehikhuemhen, a Nigerian citizen, hails originally from the Niger Delta region of 
the country.  His family, who are members of the Edo tribe, adhered to traditional African 
religions.  But some time after he relocated to the central capital city of Abuja, 
Ehikhuemhen met a congregant of the Living Faith Church; inspired, he converted to 
evangelical Christianity, began to proselytize, and soon convinced a Muslim fellow 
resident of Abuja to join him in the faith. 
  According to Ehikhuemhen, his Christian religious activity landed him in the 
crosshairs of local militant Islamic groups, and specifically a radical group called the 
Boko Haram,
1
 from whose ranks he had won his convert.  In early 2010, a local Imam 
sent members of the Boko Haram to storm a prayer meeting in Abuja.  Beaten and 
severely injured, Ehikhuemhen suffered internal bleeding and was hospitalized for a 
month.  His fellow congregants sought help from the police, who allegedly refused to 
                                                 
1
 The Boko Haram “promotes a version of Islam which makes it ‘haram,’ or forbidden, 
for Muslims to take part in any political or social activity associated with Western 
society.  . . . Its political goal was to create an Islamic state . . . .”  Administrative Record 
432–33.  
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render assistance because, as Muslims, “they sided with [the] attackers.”  Later, Boko 
Haram groups burned down the market in Abuja where Ehikhuemhen’s shop was located 
“because it was on the way to the Living Faith Church.”  After these attacks, and 
realizing that the Boko Haram could readily identify him, Ehikhuemhen decided to flee to 
the United States.  Administrative Record (A.R.)
2
 365, 474–75. 
 Having been paroled into the United States for the purpose of criminal 
prosecution,
3
 Ehikhuemhen was served in September 2011 with a Notice to Appear.  He 
was alleged to be inadmissible under several subsections of 8 U.S.C. § 1182, including 
the provision dealing with crimes involving moral turpitude.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); A.R. 519–20.  Although at first Ehikhuemhen contested certain of 
the charges, see A.R. 332–33, he eventually conceded both the individual factual 
allegations and his overall inadmissibility, see A.R. 338. 
 Ehikhuemhen then filed a defensive application for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and CAT protection, based on the incidents recounted above and his continuing 
fear of persecution.  Among the materials submitted in support of Ehikhuemhen’s 
application were: a letter from his brother, castigating Ehikhuemhen for his conversion 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2
 All citations to the Administrative Record refer to the record compiled in C.A. No. 13-
1552, which contains materials pertaining to all three petitions for review. 
 
3
 Ehikhuemhen pleaded guilty to one count of visa fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)), and 
received a three-month sentence.  See Judgment 1–2, ECF No. 9, E.D.N.Y. Crim. No. 
1:11-cr-00542. 
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while obliquely referencing his beating, A.R. 449; a baptismal certificate from the Living 
Faith Church in Abuja, A.R. 450; and an affidavit from Ehikhuemhen’s brother-in-law, 
A.R. 439–40.  The affidavit purported to explain the absence of certain documents from 
Ehikhuemhen’s evidentiary submissions, despite the best efforts of the brother-in-law and 
his family to locate them.  For example, no police report on the 2010 beating was 
available because “the police station was burn[ed] down by the Boko Haram in 2011.”  
A.R. 439. 
 At his merits hearing before the Immigration Judge (IJ), Ehikhuemhen testified in 
support of his applications for relief.  In describing the 2010 assault by Boko Haram 
members, Ehikhuemhen explained that he was “bitterly injured” and hospitalized for a 
month.  A.R. 366.  However, he struggled on cross examination to articulate the precise 
extent of his injuries, expressing confusion over the meaning of “surgery” while 
testifying that he was treated for broken bones in his leg and back.  See A.R. 384.  
Ehikhuemhen pointed to his light skin-tone as something that would lead to his easy 
identification and would, presumably, make relocating difficult.  A.R. 369–70.   For its 
part, the Government emphasized Ehikhuemhen’s ability to relocate throughout the 
proceedings.  See, e.g., A.R. 380 (discussing the distance between Abuja and Lagos), 
389–90, 395 (closing statement); see also 391 (discussing Nigeria’s “very large Christian 
community”).   
 The IJ ultimately denied Ehikhuemhen’s application for relief.  Despite finding 
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him to be credible, see A.R. 289, the IJ determined that Ehikhuemhen had failed to 
corroborate certain essential aspects of his story, such as the extent of his injuries after 
the first attack.  A.R. 290.  The IJ characterized the market attack as the lamentable 
product of “general violence.”  A.R. 292; see also A.R. 293 (“Unfortunately, Respondent 
appears to be one of many Nigerian store owners whose lives were negatively impacted 
by persistent religious hostility.”).  She separately decided that Ehikhuemhen had not 
satisfied his burden of showing a well-founded fear of future persecution, in part because 
he “failed to establish that his fear of persecution is country-wide.”  A.R. 294.  In fact, 
relying upon the 2010 State Department International Religious Freedom Report, the IJ 
explicitly found that “there are areas within Nigeria where [Ehikhuemhen] can relocate to 
and live without fear of future persecution.”  A.R. 294.   
 Ehikhuemhen timely sought review from the BIA, but to no success.  The BIA 
affirmed, holding that the IJ “complied with the Third Circuit’s corroboration 
requirements” and properly denied relief after “consider[ing] the totality of the evidence.”  
A.R. 249–50.  Without corroboration, Ehikhuemhen had not met his burden of proof of 
showing either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.  A.R. 250.  
The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s relocation finding.  A.R. 251.    
Shortly thereafter, Ehikhuemhen obtained two new pieces of evidence.  The first 
was a report on the Boko Haram issued by the Human Rights Watch that purportedly 
showed the group’s expanding geographical influence.  The second was “a letter . . . from 
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the hospital where [Ehikhuemhen] was treated after his attack.”  A.R. 137–38.  
Ehikhuemhen thus filed a timely motion to reopen in the BIA.   
 The BIA again denied relief.  It decided (inter alia) that the hospital letter was not 
previously unavailable and that the Human Rights Watch report was based on incidents 
predating Ehikhuemhen’s final hearing.  A.R. 107.  Moreover, Ehikhuemhen had failed 
to show that the report would be likely to affect the outcome of his proceedings.  A.R. 
107.  For example, a kidnapping incident, although involving a man from Southeast 
Nigeria, likely occurred in the Northeast region of the country.  A.R. 108 (citing A.R. 
171, which references a “compound in Maiduguri,” a Northeastern city).   
 After gathering yet more evidence in support of his application, Ehikhuemhen 
filed a motion for reconsideration of the BIA’s second order.4  See A.R. 17.  The 
keystone of the new set of documents was a Jamestown Foundation report that “included 
specific evidence that the persecution of Christians has recently extended into the South 
of Nigeria.”  A.R. 17.  Several statements from one Bala Elbir were also included, 
detailing Mr. Elbir’s attempts to earlier obtain the medical document that had been 
supplied with the motion to reopen.  See, e.g., A.R. 95.  
 The BIA again denied relief.  Construing the motion as both a motion to 
                                                 
4
 The procedural history of this submission is a bit more tangled than our summary would 
suggest, but as the BIA accepted all of Ehikhuemhen’s filings at face value, we need not 
worry about the propriety or stylings of his multiple filings, despite their apparent 
noncompliance with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) and the relevant statutory equivalents.  
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reconsider and a motion to reopen, the BIA identified “no legal authority” or previously 
unavailable evidence that would suggest error in its previous dispositions.  A.R. 2.  “Nor 
d[id] the supplemental evidence warrant reopening.”  A.R. 2.   
 We consolidated Ehikhuemhen’s three petitions for review by order of January 7, 
2013.  The case is fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. 
II. Jurisdiction
5
 and Standard of Review 
 We may ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over final orders of removal—so long as 
petitions for review are timely filed—and will generally review the BIA’s decision except 
to the extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ’s decision.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(1); Calla-Collado v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 680, 683 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
Ehikhuemhen filed timely petitions from each separate order, as he was required to do.  
See Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2012).  However, that is not the end 
                                                 
5
 In our April 3, 2013 order denying Ehikhuemhen’s second motion to stay his removal, 
we directed the parties to discuss “the basis and extent of our jurisdiction over this 
matter,” as we had detected a possible jurisdictional limitation (discussed further above 
the margin) that neither party acknowledged in its motions-stage submissions.  The 
petitioner has complied, albeit in a somewhat cursory fashion.  The Government, by 
contrast, has completely failed to discuss the jurisdictional problem we highlighted in our 
order, and has not otherwise meaningfully responded to the jurisdictional contentions 
raised in the petitioner’s brief.  See also Pet’r’s Reply Br. 2 n.2 (observing that the 
Government has failed to respond to jurisdictional issues).  We are nevertheless required 
to address the scope of our jurisdiction even without assistance or advocacy from the 
Government.  See Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 983 F.2d 1267, 1275 (3d Cir. 1993); see also 
In re Caterbone, 640 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that subject-matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited).   
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of our jurisdictional inquiry, because an additional statutory provision affects the breadth 
of our jurisdiction in this case. 
 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), we lack “jurisdiction to review any final order of 
removal against an alien who is removable[, inter alia,] by reason of having committed a 
criminal offense covered in [8 U.S.C. §] 1182(a)(2).”   Ehikhuemhen conceded that he 
was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and therefore § 1252(a)(2)(C) 
plainly applies.  See Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 102 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 
Freeman v. Holder, 596 F.3d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 2010).  As a result, we cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over factual or discretionary determinations made by the agency.  See 
Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006).  However, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) restores our jurisdiction to review “colorable” constitutional claims or 
questions of law.  Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2010).  “We 
review legal determinations de novo, subject to [Chevron] principles of deference . . . .”  
Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 
The criminal-alien restriction on, and partial restoration of, our jurisdiction applies 
with equal force to the review of motions to reopen and to reconsider.  Cruz v. Att’y 
Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 246–47 (3d Cir. 2006); accord Hanan v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 760, 763 
(8th Cir. 2008); Durant v. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir. 2004).  Thus, we may review a 
denial of a motion to reopen in this context only if the agency’s decision was contrary to 
law or rose to the level of a denial of due process.  See, e.g., Alzainati v. Holder, 568 
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F.3d 844, 850 (10th Cir. 2009).  Both kinds of motions are otherwise reviewed under the 
same deferential abuse of discretion standard.  Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
III. Discussion 
 Having established our standard of review and the limitations on our jurisdiction, 
we will address each of the claims raised in Ehikhuemhen’s opening brief.   
 A) Agency Misapplication of Corroboration Requirements 
 In his sole challenge to the BIA’s original merits decision, Ehikhuemhen 
maintains that the agency erred by departing from the corroboration process of Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001), which was codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B) by the REAL ID Act.  See Dong v. Att’y Gen., 638 F.3d 223, 229 n.3 
(3d Cir. 2011).  To the extent that this is a reviewable question of law, see Alvarado-
Carillo v. INS, 251 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 2001), we need not reach it, because resolving 
the matter would not change the outcome of the case. 
 The IJ explicitly found that Ehikhuemhen could relocate within Nigeria to escape 
persecution.  While the IJ did not explicitly discuss the burden-shifting framework of a 
relocation finding, the record supports that the Government showed, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that relocation was both possible and reasonable.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)–(ii), (b)(2)(ii), (b)(3)(i)–(ii).  Ehikhuemhen obviously disagrees, and 
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has contested the matter since.  But the BIA upheld the IJ’s relocation determination on 
appeal and thereafter—it has survived undiminished.  Because a relocation finding is a 
factual question, it is unreviewable when 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) applies.  Cf. 
Gambashidze v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Perez-Ramirez v. 
Holder, 648 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2011); Arboleda v. Att’y Gen., 434 F.3d 1220, 1224 
(11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
6
  Even if the agency erred in its corroboration analysis, and 
even if Ehikhuemhen were then found to have suffered past persecution, the relocation 
finding would stand, preventing him from winning asylum.  Thus, relief cannot be 
granted on this claim. 
B) The BIA’s Denial of Ehikhuemhen’s Motions with Respect to his Medical  
     Information 
 Ehikhuemhen argues that the BIA erred when it determined that reopening was not 
warranted because his medical records “were reasonably available before [his] hearing.”  
See Pet’r’s Br. 24–25; A.R. 2, 107.  He maintains that “[t]he BIA’s finding regarding the 
availability of the records is not supported by substantial evidence” because “any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude” that Mr. Elbir could not have 
obtained the records any sooner than he did. 
                                                 
6
 Ehikhuemhen does not, in his opening brief, challenge the legal test used to determine 
whether relocation was possible or reasonable.  See Gambashidze, 381 F.3d at 192; see 
also Dwumaah v. Att’y Gen., 609 F.3d 586, 589 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010) (deeming waived 
those matters not raised in an opening brief).  Nor is it clear that he exhausted any such 
claim before the agency.  See A.R. 261 (contesting, in BIA brief, the factual aspects of 
IJ’s relocation determination); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  
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 Ehikhuemhen’s argument refers to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), which states that “[a] 
motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that 
evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been 
discovered or presented at the former hearing.”  While we do not appear to have 
addressed, in a precedential opinion, whether the prior unavailability of evidence is a 
factual or legal determination, the BIA here simply determined, based on the totality of 
Ehikhuemhen’s submissions, that the letter (or its equivalent) could have been discovered 
sooner.  We think that this is a factual determination falling beyond the boundaries of our 
present jurisdiction—indeed, Ehikhuemhen seems to implicitly concede this by urging a 
substantial-evidence standard of review, which is reserved for issues of fact.  See, e.g., 
Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012).  Accordingly, we hold that we lack 
jurisdiction to address this claim.
7
 
 C) The BIA’s Consideration of the Human Rights Watch Report 
 Next, Ehikhuemhen argues that the BIA “abused its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Ehikhuemhen’s motion to reopen his removal proceedings to permit consideration of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
7
 We note parenthetically that the medical evidence, which is limited to a single letter 
from a doctor at the University of Benin Teaching Hospital, is not quite as persuasive as 
Ehikhuemhen appears to believe.  In the letter, Dr. Akhigbe refers to neurological and 
abdominal symptoms, such as a subarachnoid hemorrhage, and treatment directed at 
those symptoms.  See A.R. 220; Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 127 (28th ed. 2006).  But 
at his merits hearing, Ehikhuemhen testified that he was treated for leg and back injuries.  
See A.R. 384.  We question whether this letter would have addressed the IJ’s concerns 
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HRW Report.”  Pet’r’s Br. 25.  The BIA initially denied reopening in part because the 
incidents underlying the report were previously discoverable.  See A.R. 107.  The BIA 
reaffirmed this aspect of its decision when denying Ehikhuemhen’s motion for 
reconsideration.  See A.R. 2.  In so doing, it pointed out that the burden of proof with 
regard to prior unavailability rested on Ehikhuemhen’s shoulders.  See Pllumi v. Att’y 
Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011).  Because the BIA’s decision rested in part on the 
availability of the evidence—a factor that sufficiently supports the outcome reached by 
the agency—we lack jurisdiction to address this claim. 
 D) The BIA’s Consideration of the Jamestown Report 
 Ehikhuemhen alleges that the BIA erred when it determined that the Jamestown 
Report was not material.  Pet’r’s Br. 26–28.   In other contexts, we have emphasized that 
materiality is a mixed question of fact and law.  See, e.g., Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 
223, 233 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009).  “A mixed question of fact and law is one that requires 
application of a legal standard to a particular set of circumstances.”  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 
620 F.3d 372, 384 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  These mixed questions have been 
held to be reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  See Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 
849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citation omitted); cf. Rosario v. Holder, 627 F.3d 
58, 62 (2d Cir. 2010).   
 To the extent that we may review the BIA’s determination, however, we cannot 
                                                                                                                                                             
regarding the extent of Ehikhuemhen’s injuries, as it is inconsistent with his testimony, is 
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conclude that it represented an abuse of discretion.  The dispute here is one of 
interpretation, as well as of the extent of risk.  We cannot say that the BIA’s decision here 
is either flawed by an error of law, uses an incorrect legal standard, or is so without 
rational justification as to be legally erroneous.  See Rosario, 627 F.3d at 62.  
Accordingly, we cannot grant relief on this claim. 
 E) Establishing a Prima Facie Case for Asylum 
 Ehikhuemhen argues that he has established a prima facie case for asylum via his 
supplemental submissions, when that evidence is considered in tandem with 
documentation already in the record.  See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988); Smith 
v. Holder, 627 F.3d 427, 438 (1st Cir. 2010).  But neither of the BIA orders in question 
referred to whether Ehikhuemhen made a prima facie case for asylum; and, even if they 
had done so, we would be unable to review those outcomes.  See Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 
503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen [the BIA] denies a motion to reopen on the 
ground that the applicant has failed to make a prima facie showing, we . . . review that 
determination to ensure that it is supported by substantial evidence and is not an abuse of 
discretion.”); see also Larngar v. Holder, 562 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that “a 
number of courts” review these cases for substantial evidence, thereby “suggest[ing] that 
we lack jurisdiction in this context,” but ultimately declining to answer the question). 
IV. Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                             
not a formal medical record, and is not a contemporaneous report.   
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 Having examined the claims raised in Ehikhuemhen’s brief, we conclude that we 
partly lack jurisdiction to review them, and must otherwise deny the remainder as being 
without merit.  We will therefore dismiss these petitions for review in part and deny them 
in part. 
